Twelve percent of the Malawian population is HIV infected. Eighteen percent of sexual encounters are casual. A condom is used a third of the time. To analyze the Malawian epidemic, a choice-theoretic general equilibrium search model is constructed. In the developed framework, people select between different sexual practices while knowing the inherent risk. The calibrated model is used to study several policy interventions; namely, ART, circumcision, better condoms, and the treatment of other STDs. The efficacy of public policy depends upon the induced behavioral changes and equilibrium effects. The framework complements the insights from epidemiological studies and small-scale field experiments.
An Equilibrium Model of the African HIV/AIDS Epidemic
Econometrica, 2019 87(4): 1081-1113. With J. Greenwood, C. Santos and M. Tertilt
A calibrated equilibrium search model of an HIV/AIDS epidemic is developed to analyze the direct impact and the behavioral adjustment to policies.
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Journal of Monetary Economics, 2008, Vol. 55, pp. 1054-1066. With M. Galenianos. We characterize price dispersion and welfare in a monetary model with private information: inflation is regressive even though the rich hold more money. Go to paper
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Review of Economic Studies, 2015, Vol 82 (2), 659-692. With Fane Groes and Iourii Manovskii. Occupational mobility is highest for high and low earners, and the former move “up” and the latter “down” as in models of vertical re-sorting. Go to paper
Review of Economic Studies, 2019 86(4): 1411-1447. With Michèle Belot and Paul Muller. We develop and evaluate experimentally a novel tool that redesigns the job search process by providing tailored online advice about related occupations. Go to paper
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Econometrica, 2010, Vol. 78(2), 539–574. With Jan Eeckhout. In search models with price competition the sorting of heterogeneous buyers and sellers depends on complementarities both in output and in search. Go to paper
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Econometrica. 2018 86(1): 85-132. With Jan Eeckhout. When heterogeneous firms can choose both how many and which workers to hire, we illustrate consequences for firm-size and wage inequality. Note a correction for the condition with capital: corrigendum. Go to paper
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Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008/123(2), pp. 621-661. With A. Postlewaite. [technical appendix] In a model of social learning, the better informed (wealthier) consumers get preferential service because their consumption signals high quality to others. Go to paper
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International Economic Review, 2011, 52(1), pp 85-104. With M. Galenianos and G. Virag. [technical appendix] In directed search with a finite population, minimum wages improve employment but reduce output and efficiency, and reverse for unemployment benefits. Go to paper
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Journal of Economic Literature, 2021 59(1): 90-148. With R. Wright,B. Julien, and V. Guerrieri. This survey presents a comprehensive overview of the directed/competitive search literature. Go to paper