We propose a simple method to elicit time preferences at the individual level even when income and consumption varies over time. We validate the method and apply it to correlate individuals’ impatience with job search behavior and success.
Eliciting time preferences when income and consumption vary: Theory, validation & application to job search
With Michèle Belot and Paul Muller. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2025, 17 (1): 130–170.
We propose a simple method to elicit time preferences at the individual level even when income and consumption varies over time. We validate the method and apply it to correlate individuals’ impatience with job search behavior and success.
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Journal of Economic Theory, 2010/145, 1354-1385. With Jan Eeckhout. Search affects competing mechanisms: if meetings with low types reduce those of high types, price posting and market separation replace auctions. Go to paper
joint with L.Brotherhood, C. Santos and M. Tertilt, accepted at Review of Economic Studies. This paper investigates the importance of the age composition for pandemic policy design in a framework with age heterogeneity, individual choice, and incomplete information, emphasizing the value of testing and testing capacity buildup. Optimal social policy follows an asymmetric approach by locking down the young relatively more than the old, and testing substantially lowers economic costs and laxer lockdown. We use the framework to provide systematic insights into pandemics caused by different viruses. Go to paper
Econometrica, 2019 87(4): 1081-1113. With J. Greenwood, C. Santos and M. Tertilt A calibrated equilibrium search model of an HIV/AIDS epidemic is developed to analyze the direct impact and the behavioral adjustment to policies. Go to paper
Journal of Political Economy, 2017, 124(1), 224-264. With G. Grossman & E. Helpman. (simulations, matlab). We introduce two-sided heterogeneity into a Hecksher-Ohlin-style trade model to study factor reallocation and wage inequality within and across sectors. Go to paper
Publications
Econometrica, 2010, Vol. 78(2), 539–574. With Jan Eeckhout. In search models with price competition the sorting of heterogeneous buyers and sellers depends on complementarities both in output and in search. Go to paper
Publications
Review of Economic Studies, 2011, Vol. 78 (3), 872-906. With Jan Eeckhout. Wage and employment data can identify the strength of sorting in search models, though two-sided fixed effects are always mis-specified. Go to paper
Publications
Review of Economic Studies, 2015, Vol 82 (2), 659-692. With Fane Groes and Iourii Manovskii. Occupational mobility is highest for high and low earners, and the former move “up” and the latter “down” as in models of vertical re-sorting. Go to paper
Publications
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008/123(2), pp. 621-661. With A. Postlewaite. [technical appendix] In a model of social learning, the better informed (wealthier) consumers get preferential service because their consumption signals high quality to others. Go to paper