This paper presents an equilibrium labor search model in which workers can simultaneously apply to multiple firms to increase their search intensity. They observe firms’ wage postings before choosing where to apply. Owing to coordination frictions, a firm may not receive any applications; otherwise it is able to hire unless all its applicants have better offers. It is shown that the equilibrium converges to the efficient Walrasian outcome as application costs vanish. Even for non-negligible application costs, the entry of firms, the search intensity, and the number of filled vacancies are constrained efficient. Wage dispersion is essential for constrained efficiency
Efficiency of Simultaneous Search
Journal of Political Economy, 2009, Vol. 117(5), pp. 861- 913.
In a directed search where workers apply for multiple jobs and are then allocated via a stable matching, efficiency arises at all stages.
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